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Chapter 4 
Asymmetries in Judgements of 
Ingroup and Outgroup Variability 
Thierry Devos, Loraine Comby and Jean-Claude Deschamps 
University of Lausanne 
ABSTRACT 
It is common to observe an asymmetry in judgements of intragroup variability: 
sometimes the outgroup is perceived as being more homogeneous than the 
ingroup, while the opposite is true at other times. A review of the literature on 
this theme is presented, including information on the techniques used to mea- 
sure perceived variability within groups. The empirical research is briefly dis- 
cussed. The explanatory principles posited in this particular field of research are 
described. Among these principles, a distinction is made between cognitive and 
motivational approaches. Several approaches which integrate both cognitive and 
motivational factors are also examined. Finally. the need to take account of 
different levels of analysis is emphasized. 
INTRODUCTION 
Most Americans are superficial and often behave like children. 
It is true that, broadly speaking, the Swiss are hardworking and rather 
uncommunicative. 
A piece of advice: never do business with Italians. They are all the same: they 
just cannot be trusted! 
European Review of Social Psychology, Volume 7 .  Edited by Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone. 
0 1996 John Wdey & Sons Ltd. 
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96 THIERRY DEVOS. LORAINE COMBY AND JEAN-CLAUDE DESCHAMPS 
You talk about the British as though they were all alike, but the question is not 
that simple! Welsh people have little in common with Londoners and even less 
with Scots. 
Among the students with whom I am acquainted, there is every imaginable style. 
We form a wonderful group of friends, even though our personalities are very 
different. 
Words of this kind, which reflect our perception, knowledge and judgements 
of the groups constituting our social environment, are frequent in our every- 
day lives. They do more than simply associate characteristics, features or 
behaviours with groups of people: they actually contain information on the 
internal variability of the groups under consideration. When we state that 
most members of a group possess a given characteristic, it means that we 
judge them to be relatively similar in that regard. When we make distinctions 
between the members of a group, it means that we perceive that group as a 
heterogeneous entity. 
The past 15 years have seen the publication of several studies focusing on 
judgements of intragroup variability.’ Most argue that ingroups and out- 
groups are often perceived differently in regard to the variability of their 
members. The expression “outgroup homogeneity effect” has been coined to 
describe the tendency of subjects to perceive an outgroup as having greater 
homogeneity than an ingroup (Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981).2 The op- 
posite tendency is known as an “ingroup homogeneity effect” (Simon & 
Brown, 1987), i.e. when the perceived homogeneity is greater within an in- 
group than an outgroup. In this paper, we propose to review the major studies 
which have concentrated on such asymmetries. 
Before we proceed any further, however, we should stress that the studies 
we are about to review are often said to draw some of their inspiration from 
the investigations into stereotypes (Katz & Braly, 1933) and social categoriza- 
tion (Tajfel. 1959). For a long time, stereotypes were defined as images or 
beliefs relating to characteristics shared by the members of a group (on this 
subject, see Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Today, stereotypes are viewed rather as 
group representations with varying degrees of homogenization (Linville, 
Salovey, & Fischer, 1986). Some researchers consider that this shift is due to a 
gradual loss of interest in the content of stereotypes to the benefit of the 
cognitive processes which such stereotypes call into play (Park, Judd, & Ryan, 
1991). Categorization is one of those processes. We should recall here that 
The terminology in this field of research is diverse: one speaks of intragroup “variability”, 
“homogeneity”, “heterogeneity”, “assimilation” and even “differentiation”. In this paper, “ho- 
mogeneity” and “heterogeneity” are used to compare groups with respect to their “variability”. 
which we view as a more general term. 
Some authors use these terms to describe a group’s tendency to be perceived as being more 
heterogeneous by people who belong to it than by people who don’t (Park & Rothbart, 1982). 
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ASYMMETRIES IN JUDGEMENTS OF INTRAGROUP VARIABILITY 97 
Tajfel’s propositions (1972; 1981) describe the conditions in which categoriza- 
tion produces effects of contrast (or cognitive differentiation) between cate- 
gories and assimilation (or cognitive stereotypicality) within such categories. 
However, research based on this approach has traditionally emphasized the 
examination of intercategory differentiation, particularly with respect to its 
ethnocentric nature (Brewer, 1979; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992), rather 
than intracategory differentiation. 
Despite the many features which studies on judgements of variability and 
investigations into stereotypes or social categorization have in common, it 
would be erroneous to suggest the existence of a direct link between them. 
Studies on judgements of variability evolved primarily on the basis of the 
intuition that a group to which one does not belong is perceived as being more 
homogeneous than a group to which one does. The first priority in this field 
consisted in bringing to the fore the outgroup homogeneity effect, which was 
made possible using various categorization criteria (Goethals, Allison, & 
Frost, 1979; Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981; Park & Rothbart, 1982). 
Since then, several attempts have been made at explaining the outgroup 
homogeneity effect. Familiarity has been the most frequently posited explana- 
tion (Taylor et al., 1978 Taylor, 1981), no doubt because it seems so evident. If 
subjects perceive more heterogeneity in the ingroup than they do in the 
outgroup, it is because they interact more frequently and in a wider range of 
contexts with the members of the first group than they do with those of the 
second, because they are more familiar with the first group than with the 
second. What is emphasized in this type of explanation is the knowledge or 
information on which subjects can draw. On this basis, various models were 
developed in an effort to describe how subjects deal with information to 
which they are exposed and how they express judgements of variability (Lin- 
ville, Salovey, & Fischer, 1986; Park & Hastie, 1987). This type of approach 
has become increasingly popular. Earlier models have been revised (Judd & 
Park, 1988; Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990) and new 
models developed (Kashima & Kashima, 1993; Kraus er al., 1993). In some 
cases, these models deal with asymmetry in judgements of variability in an 
indirect manner, their primary objective remaining the understanding of how 
judgements of variability are expressed, generally speaking. 
Motivational explanations began to emerge, alongside cognitive explana- 
tions. But they never enjoyed the same level of attention as their cognitive 
counterparts, possibly because of social psychology’s keen interest in the 
study of cognitive processes. Among the motivations frequently posited to 
explain asymmetries in judgements of variability, one finds the need to vali- 
date personal opinions (Goethals, Allison, & Frost, 1979), the need to ensure 
predictability of the outgroup (Stephan, 1977), the need to justify discrimina- 
tory behaviours and to protect oneself against them (Wilder, 1986), the needs 
to assimilate and to differentiate between the self and others (Brewer, 1993), 
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98 THIERRY DEVOS, LORAINE COMBY AND JEAN-CLAUDE DESCHAMPS 
and finally the need to acquire and to preserve a positive social identity 
(Simon & Brown, 1987). This last motivation has received the most attention 
(Simon, 1992b). 
Early intuitions gradually developed into reasoned developments based on 
sound theoretical backing. At the same time, researchers fine-tuned their 
procedures. Various techniques to measure perceived variability were elabo- 
rated (on this subject, see Linville, Salovey, & Fischer, 1986; Park & Judd, 
1990, Quattrone, 1986). Furthermore, the study of natural groups was some- 
times discarded to the benefit of research on experimentally-created groups 
(Judd & Park, 1988; Mackie, Sherman, & Worth, 1993; Simon & Brown, 1987; 
Simon & Pettigrew, 1990; Wilder, 1984). As a result, a number of problems 
associated with natural groups were circumvented, given that it was possible 
to minimize, or at least better control, the role played by subjects’ knowledge 
of the ingroup and outgroup. 
Several authors have carried out a review of the literature on asymmetries 
in judgements of intragroup variability (Linville, Salovey, & Fischer, 1986 
Messick & Mackie, 1989; Mullen & Hu, 1989; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992; 
Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991; Quattrone, 1986; Simon; 1990; 1992b). Since the 
publication of these papers, discussions centred on this particular topic have 
been enriched by a considerable amount of new material. In our view, it is a 
worthwhile exercise to take stock of the situation as it stands today. This 
paper should be viewed as supplementing its predecessors. We should also 
underscore the choice we have made to treat the outgroup and ingroup ho- 
mogeneity effects on an equal footing, in contrast to many past papers which 
have focused primarily on the outgroup homogeneity effect. More than 
merely summarizing the empirical results published to date, this paper gives 
an account of the explanatory principles which can help describe asymmetries 
in judgements of variability. Without privileging one particular approach, we 
will strive to describe the explanatory principles in some detail, giving their 
theoretical foundations prior to quoting examples from current research. 
The first parts of this paper will be largely devoted to empirical questions. 
Today, a wide array of techniques help us to understand judgements of vari- 
ability better; these will be presented in our review. Over 40 studies have been 
published to date on judgements of variability. This paper will offer a succinct 
description of these studies. Subsequently, we will examine the explanatory 
principles posited to describe the outgroup and ingroup homogeneity effects, 
looking first at principles stemming from a cognitive approach, prior to focus- 
ing on those which call into play mainly motivational factors. In this particular 
field of research, some authors recently underscored the need to take account 
of both cognitive and motivational factors (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992; Sed- 
ikides & Ostrom, 1993). So far, a handful of attempts have been made in this 
direction (Haslam et al., 1995; in press; Marques, 1993; Marques, Robalo, & 
Rocha, 1992; Simon, 1993); they will also be presented. Finally, we will explain 
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ASYMMETRIES IN JUDGEMENTS OF INTRAGROUP VARIABILITY 99 
why it is important, in our opinion, to take account of factors which do not 
pertain exclusively to an intra-individual level of analysis (Doise, 1986) when 
studying judgements of variability. 
MEASURING PERCEIVED VARIABILITY 
Techniques used to measure perceived variability within a group have been 
classified in various ways (Linville, Salovey, & Fischer, 1986; Park & Judd, 
1990; Quattrone, 1986). Park and Judd (1990, Experiment 1) compare judge- 
ments of Variability obtained with different techniques. They show that these 
judgements have two main facets: the first relates to the dispersion of a 
group’s members on a given dimension, while the second has to do with the 
degree of applicability to a group of the stereotype with which it is associated. 
These two aspects seem to be independent or non-correlated. The concept of 
intragroup variability is more or less directly linked to the statistical meaning 
of the word “dispersion”. Thus, it is not difficult to see that the range and 
standard deviation of the distribution of a group’s members represent ade- 
quate indicators of their variability. The same cannot be said of measures of 
stereotypicality, which refer to a group’s central tendency rather than to its 
internal variability. One may nonetheless consider that, the more a group is 
stereotyped, the greater is its homogeneity. 
Measures of Dispersion (DIS) 
Among measures of dispersion, two techniques are more frequently used: 
0 The range ofa  distribution: subjects are asked to indicate, on a bipolar scale, 
the two endpoints between which 50% of the members of a group are 
situated (Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981). The greater the distance be- 
tween these two endpoints, the higher the group’s perceived variability. 
Sometimes, subjects are asked to perform the same exercise for 100% of 
the members of a group and also to indicate where they are situated on 
average (Park & Judd, 1990). 
0 The formation of a distribution: subjects are asked to indicate, on a bipolar 
scale, how one hundred members of a group are distributed (Linville, Sa- 
lovey, & Fischer, 1986). This type of scale may include the six following 
alternatives: “very introvert”, “quite introvert”, “slightly introvert”, 
“slightly extrovert”, “quite extrovert”, “very extrovert”. A more simple 
version of this technique consists in asking subjects to allocate to each 
alternative small stickers representing given numbers of members (Park & 
Judd, 1990). Several indexes may be calculated with this technique (Lin- 
ville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989). The variance and standard deviation of the 
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100 THIERRY DEVOS, LORAINE COMBY AND JEAN-CLAUDE DESCHAMPS 
distribution produced by subjects represent dispersion indexes. The prob- 
ability that given members of a group appear in different alternatives on 
the scale may be taken to represent an index of perceived variability. The 
mean provides an index of the group’s central tendency. 
Measures of Stereotypicality (STE) 
The two techniques we have just discussed provide indexes of central tend- 
ency. On the condition that the dimensions of judgement be selected for that 
purpose (Park & Judd, 1990), such techniques can provide a measure of 
stereotypicality: the more subjects attribute to a group its stereotypic charac- 
teristics and the less they attribute counter-stereotypic characteristics, the 
lower the perceived variability. 
A relatively common technique provides a measure of stereotypicality in a 
more direct manner. It consists in asking subjects to evaluate, with respect to a 
group’s stereotypic and counter-stereotypic characteristics, the proportion of 
members to which such characteristics apply (Park & Rothbart, 1982). This 
evaluation is usually expressed in percentage points. Here, one may consider 
that the more the percentage of stereotypic characteristics is high and the 
percentage of counter-stereotypic characteristics low, the lower the perceived 
variability. 
Global Measures (GLO) 
Another technique, whose merit lies in its simplicity, consists in asking sub- 
jects to globally evaluate a group’s variability (Quattrone & Jones, 1980) 
using a scale which may range from “almost all are alike” to “all are com- 
pletely different”. This type of measure appears to be linked, albeit in a 
tenuous manner, to measures of dispersion and stereotypicality (Park & Judd, 
1990). 
Other Measures (OTH) 
A number of other techniques may also provide measures of perceived vari- 
ability (Lee & Ottati, 1993; Stephan, 1977; Wilder, 1984). The global judge- 
ment technique can, for instance, be adapted in order to obtain measures of 
variability on particular dimensions (Clkmence, 1993). We should point out 
that several studies involving the memorization and retrieval of information 
sometimes bring to the fore asymmetries similar to those posited here (see, 
for instance, Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Bothwell, Brigham, & Mal- 
pass, 1989; Brewer, Weber, & Carini, 1995; Frable & Bem, 1985; Lorenzi- 
Cioldi, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly, & Stewart, 1995; Ostrom et al., 1993). 
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ASYMMETRIES IN JUDGEMENTS OF INTRAGROUP VARIABILITY 101 
However, the problems underlying this research are somewhat different from 
those we are dealing with here: they pertain more to person memory than to 
judgements of intragroup variability. It is for this reason that we decided to 
bypass the above studies in this paper. 
The techniques we have just examined provide measures of perceived vari- 
ability which are not interchangeable (Park & Judd, 1990). It would seem 
advisable, therefore, at the level of empirical research, not to limit one’s 
investigations to a single type of measure (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). The 
impact of a given factor may vary according to the type of measure used 
(Sedikides & Ostrom, 1993). Comparing judgements produced with different 
techniques not only leads to a better understanding of the processes involved 
but also ensures that conclusions regarding the possible role of a factor are 
not drawn too hastily. Furthermore, the idea of supplementing judgements of 
variability with measures capable of shedding light on them is without doubt 
of interest. Some measures enable us to grasp the complexity of represen- 
tations which subjects have of a group, as well as the manner in which such 
representations are organized (Linville & Jones, 1980; Ostrom er af., 1993; 
Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992). Other measures allow us to come to terms with 
the motivations which underlie judgements of variability (Simon & Brown, 
1987; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990). 
OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
The presentation we have chosen for our overview of empirical research is 
highly synthetical. Table 4.1 contains a list of published studies highlighting 
asymmetries in judgements of variability. Research which concludes that 
there is equal perceived variability in the ingroup and outgroup has been 
omitted from this overview. The literature contains a wide range of criteria 
which are often used to decide whether or not a particular study should be 
included in a review of this kind (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). Simon (1992b) 
suggests that a comparison between the ingroup and outgroup should be a 
within-subject variable, in order to ensure the comparative nature of the task. 
For their part, Park and Rothbart (1982) argue that investigations into natural 
groups should involve subjects from each separate group, in order to ensure 
that variability differences which may be observed do not result from objec- 
tive differences between the groups. Several studies do not satisfy the above 
criteria and, as such, could be ignored. Nonetheless, their results are helpful in 
understanding how such phenomena are dealt with. The idea of studying 
perceptual variability in tasks which have a low level of comparativeness is 
certainly of interest. A number of studies look specifically at the effects of the 
more or less comparative nature of the task (Haslam et af., 1995). Even in 
instances where research focuses on the subjects of a single group, effects 
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108 THIERRY DEVOS, LORAINE COMBY AND JEAN-CLAUDE DESCHAMPS 
linked to certain parameters, such as the salience of belonging to a group or 
the dimensions of judgement, suggest that the results which are obtained do 
more than merely illustrate the objective differences between groups (Kelly, 
1989). In spite of their “limitations”, we have included several such studies in 
Table 4.1. 
We have provided the following data for each study: 
0 Target groups In some instances, judgements pertain to natural groups, 
such as ethnic, national or gender categories, university faculties or depart- 
ments. In other instances, they pertain to experimental groups, i.e. groups 
which have been created by allegedly categorizing subjects on the basis of 
their responses to an initial task, although the categorization was in fact 
random. We have indicated instances where the comparison between in- 
group and outgroup is a between-subjects rather than within-subject 
variable. 
0 Subjects The number of subjects from each group has been indicated in 
the case of natural groups, and the overall number of subjects in the case of 
experimental groups. We have systematically listed the number of subjects 
who took part in the study, even in instances where the analysis camed out 
by the authors actually involved a smaller number of subjects, because of 
missing responses for instance. 
0 Additional independent variables Generally speaking, the target group 
and the social belonging of subjects constitute the two main independent 
variables, although researchers sometimes introduce other parameters. We 
have indicated only those parameters directly influencing asymmetry in 
judgements of variability. No mention has been made of parameters medi- 
ating perceived variability in a global manner. 
0 Measures We have used the classification referred to earlier. As a result. 
we have differentiated between measures of dispersion (DIS), measures of 
stereotypicality (STE), global measures (GLO) and other measures 
(OTH). We have not indicated the differences between various techniques 
and indexes within a given class. 
0 Main results Unfortunately, it was not possible to  describe the pattern of 
results in detail, for reasons of complexity. We limited ourselves to indicat- 
ing whether an outgroup homogeneity effect (OGHE) or an ingroup ho- 
mogeneity effect (IGHE) was highlighted, or whether the perceived 
variability was identical for the ingroup and outgroup (NO). Where poss- 
ible, we specified the conditions in which the above effects were observed. 
When a result was obtained on a single measure only, its type is indicated 
next to the relevant result. 
Table 4.1 shows the diversity of categorization criteria, the most frequently 
used types of measure and the factors which have a bearing on asymmetries in 
judgements of intragroup variability. An analysis of Table 4.1 reveals that a 
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number of authors frequently rely on one type of measure only when seeking 
to highlight perceived variability within groups. This fact is to be deplored, 
especially because studies relying on different measures usually indicate that 
results vary according to the type of measure used. Among the various param- 
eters affecting judgements of variability, we should mention in particular the 
dimensions on which such judgements were produced, the numerical and 
social status of groups, the type of interaction between groups, and the more 
or less comparative nature of the task submitted to subjects. We can also 
observe that an outgroup homogeneity effect is more often brought to the 
fore than an ingroup homogeneity effect. In instances where the latter is 
highlighted, an outgroup homogeneity effect is often present as well. We 
should point out that the great majority of studies focus on natural groups, 
although some asymmetries are revealed in studies involving experimentally 
created groups. 
Given the diverse nature of the research work contained in Table 4.1, we 
have found it difficult to go much beyond these few comments and draw 
general conclusions. As a result, our attention will focus primarily on the 
explanatory principles posited by the various authors. 
COGNITIVE APPROACHES 
A first group of explanatory principles come under the cognitive approach. 
How do subjects evaluate variability within a group? What information do 
they use to make such an evaluation? What are the processes which enable 
them to deal with such information? How do their judgements vary depend- 
ing on whether they pertain to ingroups or to outgroups? These are the types 
of questions which these explanatory principles attempt to address. As we will 
see shortly, responses differ according to what model is chosen. We should 
also point out that, behind the oppositions and discrepancies we are about to 
encounter, one can find many of the discussions currently taking place in the 
field of social cognition (Schneider, 1991; Sherman, Judd, & Park, 1989). 
To begin with, let us examine two important models: that of Linville, 
Fischer, & Salovey (1989; see also Linville & Fischer, 1993; Linville, Salovey, 
& Fischer, 1986) and that of Judd and Park (1988; see also Park & Judd, 1990; 
Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991). Both draw their inspiration from previous models 
which were developed to describe the cognitive perception of object catego- 
ries. It is customary to differentiate between two types of model in this field: 
some researchers argue that our knowledge of a given category is represented 
by exemplars of this category (Hintzman, 1986; Nosofsky, 1986), while others 
consider that such knowledge is represented by abstract properties, pro- 
totypes or lists of characteristics associated with such a category (Fried & 
Holyoak, 1984; Posner & Keel, 1968). Although the two above-mentioned 
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models borrow features from both types, the first is more in line with an 
approach emphasizing exemplars, while the second may be viewed as coming 
within the scope of an abstraction-based approach. 
An Exemplar-based Model 
The model developed by Linville, Fischer, & Salovey (1989) is based on the 
assertion that the knowledge of a group is represented by the descriptions of 
some of its exemplars (Smith & Medin, 1981). Exemplars can be either an 
individual belonging to a group, sub-groups, abstract types or stereotypic 
images. Subjects possess a list of exemplars for each group, which they store in 
their long-term memory; every exemplar is represented by a set of charac- 
teristics such as physical or personality traits, attitudes, behaviours or social 
belonging. As happens in other memory activities, processes of learning, for- 
getting and retrieval all come into play (Hintzman, 1986). The knowledge 
which subjects have of a group depends obviously on the exemplars they 
encounter. However, a selection process does take place: some items of infor- 
mation are retained, while others are forgotten. 
When expressing a judgement of group variability on a given characteristic, 
subjects retrieve or activate exemplars stored in their long-term memory, 
before creating a distribution of these exemplars on the characteristic. Vari- 
ability is thus assessed only at the time judgements are expressed and such an 
evaluation is made on the basis of exemplars stored in memory. Exemplars 
provide information on the variability of the group. Once expressed, judge- 
ments may be stored in memory. As a result, and contrary to what is some- 
times claimed, a model of this type does offer a description of how 
abstractions are shaped and memorized. However, these abstractions have no 
specific role or status in later judgements: they constitute exemplars in the 
same way as others. 
If we were to go no further, the model would not predict asymmetries in 
judgements. However, this is no longer the case when we introduce the idea 
that subjects are generally more familiar with the ingroup than the outgroup. 
Often, subjects are acquainted with more members of the ingroup than the 
outgroup: they have more frequent, more differentiated and wider-ranging 
experiences with the former than they do with the latter. As a result, the 
memory of subjects contains a higher number of exemplars of the ingroup 
than the outgroup. This explains why subjects tend to perceive the former as 
being more heterogeneous than the latter. From this point of view, the out- 
group homogeneity effect is not due so much to a distinction between ingroup 
and outgroup as to a difference in familiarity between the two. 
This explanatory principle is compatible with the results obtained by Lin- 
ville, Fischer, & Salovey (1989). When judgements pertain to different age 
groups, such as young vs. old (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989, 
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Experiment 1). or to student groups of various ethnic origin (Linville, 
Fischer, & Salovey, 1989, Experiment 2), subjects perceive the ingroup as 
being more heterogeneous than the outgroup. In both cases, one may con- 
sider that they are more familiar with the ingroup than with the outgroup. If 
such a difference in familiarity did not exist, the two groups would doubtless 
be perceived as being equally homogeneous. Within a student population, 
one can assume that subjects are almost as familiar with the members of the 
gender group to which they belong as they are with those of the group to 
which they do not. A study undertaken by these authors indicates that, in 
this case, subjects perceive almost as much homogeneity among men as they 
do among women (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989, Experiment 3), what- 
ever their own gender group. 
Many results may be interpreted on the basis that subjects are more famil- 
iar with the ingroup than they are with the outgroup. Even in the case of 
experimentally created groups, there is always at least one member of the 
ingroup with whom subjects are very familiar, namely themselves (Linville, 
Fischer, & Salovey, 1989). But familiarity is an awkward variable to measure 
and to manipulate, and demonstrating its explanatory value is no easy task. 
This notwithstanding, it would seem that, the more familiar subjects are with a 
given group, the more they perceive this group as being variable (Linville & 
Fischer, 1993; Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989, Experiment 4), at least in 
certain conditions. Data collected by Islam and Hewstone (1993) on the rela- 
tions between Hindus and Muslims in Bangladesh confirm these findings. The 
authors observe that, the more subjects have contacts with the outgroup, the 
more they perceive the outgroup as being variable. In this case, the extent of 
contacts, which may be viewed as a measure of familiarity, mediates judge- 
ments of variability. 
One should note that, subject to certain modifications, the model of Lin- 
ville, Fischer, & Salovey (1989) can integrate additional principles to explain 
asymmetries in judgements of variability. Linville and Fischer (1993) show 
how a model of this kind can take account of the fact that subjects pay greater 
attention to individuated information in the case of the ingroup, or that the 
information which subjects have on the outgroup is often second-hand infor- 
mation, conveyed by stones or the media, generally in the shape of 
stereotypes. 
An Abstraction-based Model 
In the model we have just examined, the determining factor in judgements of 
variability is the quantity of information to which subjects are exposed rather 
than the processes used to deal with such information, which are identical for 
both the ingroup and outgroup. The same cannot be said for Judd and Park’s 
model (1988). Here, the processes to deal with information are the 
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determining factor. Indeed, even when subjects possess identical information 
on the ingroup and outgroup, they do not perceive the two groups as being 
equally homogeneous. This suggestion had already been made by Park and 
Rothbart (1982) following their observation that the gender group to which 
subjects belong is perceived less stereotypically than the one to which they do 
not. At the time, the authors argued that the level at which information is 
encoded varies according to whether such information relates to an ingroup 
or an outgroup: categories used for the ingroup are more differentiated and 
subordinated (see also Mackie & Worth, 1989; Rehm, Lilli, & Strack, 1988). 
In Judd and Park’s model (1988), the distinction between various levels is a 
central consideration: subjects are likely to store information not only on the 
group considered as a whole, which includes information relating to its central 
tendency and variability (Fried & Holyoak, 1984), but also on individuals who 
make up this group. Storage of information on the outgroup and ingroup 
involves both levels. However, when subjects express judgements, they use 
the two levels differently. In the case of an outgroup, they simply recall 
information on the group as a whole. In the case of an ingroup, they recall not 
only information which they possess at that level but also information on the 
individual members of the group: their judgements are therefore based on the 
two levels. For the ingroup, the information on individuals is likely to balance 
the information on the group as a whole. How this actually occurs may vary, 
but generally speaking one can expect that information at the individual level 
increases the perceived variability inasmuch as it pertains to individuals and 
to oneself in particular. Subjects probably activate information at that level 
more easily, for the reason that the self is a particularly salient member of the 
ingroup. 
It may be useful here to underscore the opposition existing between the two 
models we have just presented. For Judd and Park (1988), an abstraction 
process occurs precisely when subjects are exposed to items of information: 
they form an opinion on the variability of the group and ulterior judgements 
will be based, at least in part, on this abstraction. For Linville, Fischer, & 
Salovey (1989), however, it is only when a judgement is sought that the 
variability of the group is assessed, an evaluation which is made on the basis of 
exemplars stored in memory. This opposition signals a common distinction in 
the field of social cognition between on-line and memory-based judgements. 
Some authors have attempted to determine whether judgements of variability 
are made using on-line or memory-based processes. Empirical results in this 
field are somewhat contradictory. Several results back the second alternative 
in view of the relative slowness of judgements of variability, particularly as 
regards the outgroup (Mackie, Sherman, & Worth, 1993, Experiments 1 and 
2). This runs counter to Judd and Park’s model (1988). Other results support 
the first alternative, given that when subjects are confronted with behaviours 
attributed to the members of a group, variability assessment is not dependent 
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on the behaviours which subjects memorize the most easily (Park & Hastie, 
1987, Experiments 1 and 2). 
Let us return to the proposition that, in the case of the ingroup only, 
judgements of variability are mediated by information about the individuals 
who make up that group. Given that the self is an important element of the 
ingroup, one may expect it to play a pivotal part in these judgements. A study 
conducted by Codol (1984a, Experiment 1) provides an illustration of this 
proposition. Here, subjects are requested to think of the ingroup alternately 
as including the self and as excluding the self the tendency to perceive the 
outgroup as being more homogeneous than the ingroup is more marked in the 
first case than in the second. Park and Judd (1990) mention two studies to 
confirm their proposition. In the first, having expressed a number of judge- 
ments of variability, subjects are asked to describe themselves and four mem- 
bers of either the ingroup or the outgroup. Results indicate that the image of 
the self is linked to the perceived variability of the ingroup, not the outgroup. 
In particular, the authors note that, the more subjects differentiate between 
themselves and the central tendency of their group, the more they perceive 
this group as being variable. This result does not really come as a surprise (see 
also Judd & Park, 1988). Another result from this study backs the model even 
more convincingly: in the case of the ingroup, judgements of variability are 
linked to the variability established on the basis of descriptions of four of its 
members, whereas such a relationship is not highlighted for the outgroup. In 
the second study referred to, subjects have to think aloud when fashioning 
their judgements of variability: they have to describe what comes to mind 
when they respond. An analysis of the comments made by subjects indicates 
that the self is mentioned more frequently when they judge the ingroup rather 
than the outgroup, a finding which confirms the model’s validity. One further 
observes that individuals are mentioned more frequently when subjects refer 
to the outgroup rather than the ingroup, a result which contradicts the model. 
A more detailed examination of comments made by subjects suggests that 
they think of the ingroup mainly in terms of sub-groups. 
Meaningful Sub-groups and Perceived Variability 
In the wake of these studies, Park, Ryan, & Judd (1992) developed the idea 
that judgements of variability are mediated by the number of meaningful sub- 
groups which subjects possess for a given group. It appears that information 
on groups is organized on the basis of a structure comprising different sub- 
groups or sub-types, and that such a structure is more differentiated in the 
case of the ingroup. This proposition is often put forth and has been occasion- 
ally supported (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Brewer & Lui, 1984; Linville, 1982; 
Linville & Jones, 1980; Taylor, 1981). Two studies carried out by Park, Ryan, 
& Judd (1992) provide a clear illustration of this hypothesis. In one of these 
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studies, business and engineering majors are asked to enumerate and to de- 
scribe the different sub-groups which come to mind when they think about the 
students in their own group and those in the other group, after which they 
express various judgements of variability. Results reveal that subjects mention 
a greater number of sub-groups for the ingroup than for the outgroup, and 
also that they perceive the former as being more heterogeneous than the 
latter. The greater the number of sub-groups mentioned by subjects for the 
ingroup rather than the outgroup, the stronger the outgroup homogeneity 
effect. The idea that meaningful sub-groups constitute a key factor in the 
perception of variability is backed by the second study; here, subjects perceive 
a given group as being more variable if, during a previous task, they are asked 
to consider its different sub-groups.3 
Mental Distributions and Perceived Variability 
Considering that existing models were inconclusive, Kraus et al. (1993) de- 
veloped a new model. In their opinion, when summarizing a group’s central 
tendency and variability on a given characteristic, subjects create mental dis- 
tributions, or frequency histograms, which include different categories. Sub- 
jects recall the frequency of observation for each alternative. In other words, 
they keep a mental tally of the number of people who fall into each category, 
updating their mental distributions as they encounter more people. In this 
model, judgements are made using both on-line and memory-based processes. 
Subjects apparently store information on people in their memory and fashion 
their judgements on the basis of a sample of them. They “summarize” these 
people at the time of encounter, noting the relative frequency of the various 
alternatives. These mental distributions are abstractions, of course, but they 
cannot be equated with a global estimation of variability. Furthermore, judge- 
ments of variability in themselves seem to require a process of abstraction to 
go from distribution to global estimation. 
In some ways, this model parallels the propositions concerning the role of 
meaningful sub-groups (Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992). It seems likely that judge- 
ments of variability depend on the number of categories used by subjects to 
create their mental distributions: the greater the number of alternatives, i.e. 
the more these distributions are detailed, the greater the perceived variability 
We should point out that some authors have opposed the idea that the ingroup is charac- 
terized by a more complex structure of knowledge than the outgroup. In the opinion of Ostrom er 
al. (1993). information on the ingroup and outgroup is not organized or structured in the same 
way, although the structures do not necessarily differ in regard to their complexity. The experi- 
ments conducted by these authors suggest that knowledge tends to be structured in terms of 
persons for the ingroup and of attributes for the outgroup, but they also demonstrate that these 
structures can be equally efficient when it comes to memorizing certain items of information (see 
also Carpenter, 1993). 
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of the group (Kraus et al., 1993, Experiment 1). This model can therefore be 
used to explain the outgroup homogeneity effect. Indeed, even when subjects 
think of one specific characteristic, they spontaneously generate more sub- 
groups for the ingroup than they do for the outgroup (Kraus et al., 1993, 
Experiment 2). 
Variability as a Consequence of Similarities and Differences 
Among recent models, we should mention also that of Kashima and Kashima 
(1993) pertaining to global judgements of variability. This relatively simple 
model draws its inspiration from several propositions by Tversky (1977) on 
judgements of similarity. Global judgements of variability result from 
similarities and differences perceived between the members of a group. Thus, 
the quantity of information available to subjects is a determining factor only if 
one takes account of what such information has to say about the similarities 
and differences within a group. Stated differently, an increase in the quantity 
of information may reduce perceived variability when such information re- 
lates to group similarities, or increase perceived variability when it relates to 
differences within the group. These two types of information are distinct, yet 
additive. 
The results of the experiment undertaken by Kashima and Kashima (1993) 
confirm the main propositions of their model. They vary the quantity of 
information which subjects possessed on the similarities and differences be- 
tween four members of a fictional group. The more subjects have information 
on the similarities between these four members, the more they perceive them 
and the group as a whole as having low variability. On the other hand, the 
more subjects have information on the differences between these four mem- 
bers, the more they perceive them and the group as a whole as having high 
variability. Similarities and differences play the role which can be expected of 
them, and the absence of interaction between the two factors suggests that 
they are additive. Nonetheless, one should note that these results are more 
definite when judgements of variability pertain to the members of the group 
rather than to the group as a whole. Furthermore, the operationalization of 
the distinction between information on similarities and information on dif- 
ferences is confounded with the distinction between information on the group 
as a whole and information on the group’s individual members. 
Although this model does not directly address the issue of asymmetries in 
judgements of variability, it is nonetheless helpful in explaining such asymme- 
tries, using two distinct principles to do so. Either one considers that subjects 
have more information of one kind concerning one of the two groups-for 
instance, if they possess more information on similarities of the outgroup, an 
outgroup homogeneity effect should normally be highlighted. O r  one con- 
siders that subjects have an equal amount of information of each kind on both 
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groups, but that one type of information is more salient for one of the two 
groups-for instance, if similarities are more salient in the case of the ingroup, 
an ingroup homogeneity effect should normally be highlighted. The validity of 
this type of argument is illustrated by an experiment conducted by Mackie, 
Sherman, & Worth (1993, Experiment 2). Having induced a categorization 
allegedly on the basis of a perceptual task, subjects receive information on the 
similarities and differences within the two groups. Not only do subjects per- 
ceive the ingroup as being more heterogeneous than the outgroup and recall 
more easily the similarities of the outgroup than those of the ingroup, but the 
more they recall the similarities between the members of a group, the more 
they perceive such a group as being homogeneous. These results are compat- 
ible with the model discussed above, except that no link is brought to the fore 
between perceived variability and the memorization of information on dif- 
ferences. The greater role played by Similarities in this instance may possibly 
be explained by the fact that, when subjects have only limited knowledge of a 
group, they pay particular attention to the similarities between its members 
(Campbell, 1956). 
Lengthy developments would be necessary to give a full account of the 
contributions and limitations of the various models presented in this part (see 
also Linville & Fischer, 1993; Mackie, Sherman, & Worth, 1993; Park, Judd, & 
Ryan, 1991). At this stage, we should like only to point out that cognitive 
approaches are epitomized by a common concern: to highlight the processes 
used by subjects when they deal with various items of information and when 
they fashion their judgements. 
MOTIVATIONAL APPROACHES 
The explanatory principles we are about to review emphasize motivational 
rather than cognitive processes. The idea here is to explain asymmetries in 
judgements of variability through their underlying motivations. We pointed 
out earlier that cognitive approaches were inspired by models in the field of 
social cognition; motivational approaches for their part generally base them- 
selves on “classical” motivations when attempting to describe human be- 
haviour. We should also mention that motivational approaches, as opposed to 
their cognitive counterparts, appear to have developed in a somewhat dis- 
jointed manner. As a consequence, one motivation is usually examined with- 
out necessarily including or precluding the intervention of other motivations. 
The Need for a Positive Social Identity 
One of the most frequently posited motivations is the need for a positive 
social identity. The pivotal role which this motivation plays in the social 
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identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) has often been underscored. In this 
approach, social identity is defined through the comparisons which subjects 
make between ingroup and outgroup. Underlying these comparisons is the 
need to establish or to preserve a positive social identity. Two types of re- 
search back the idea that the ingroup homogeneity effect stems, at least in 
part, from such a motivation: the first focuses on the relations between minor- 
ity and majority groups, while the second highlights asymmetry modulations 
in regard to dimensions of judgements. 
Numerous studies indicate that intergroup perception and behaviour de- 
pend on the numerical status of the groups under consideration, i.e. on their 
relative size (Moscovici & Paicheler, 1978; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984). Using 
as a starting point the psychological consequences of this parameter, Simon 
and Brown (1987) examine its effects on judgements of variability. Being part 
of a minority group appears to threaten the self-esteem of subjects. One 
possibility of responding to this threat is for subjects to increase their homoge- 
neity. In so doing, they mould a stronger entity and display greater solidarity 
than the outgroup. In other words, “closing ranks” leads to the preservation 
or re-establishment of a positive social identity. Subjects belonging to a major- 
ity group do not experience a threat to their self-esteem, which is relatively 
assured in this instance. As a result, such subjects tend to emphasize their 
heterogeneity: they attempt not so much to assert themselves as a group but 
rather to demonstrate that they form a sum of individualities contrasting with 
the uniformity of the outgroup. 
In the experiment conducted by Simon and Brown (1987), subjects are 
categorized allegedly on the basis of a perceptual task; they are also made 
aware of the size of each group. The researchers modify independently the 
size of the ingroup and outgroup. As the propositions of these authors sug- 
gest, the members of the minority group display an ingroup homogeneity 
effect, whereas those of the non-minority group display an outgroup homoge- 
neity effect. Considering that these effects depend on the numerical status of 
the ingroup rather than on the size of the outgroup, the results may not be 
viewed as a simple trend whereby small groups are perceived as being more 
homogeneous than large ones. In addition, responses given by subjects in a 
control condition, i.e. where subjects are not allocated to groups, show no 
consistent effect to back such a trend. Finally, the interpretation of the au- 
thors is supported by the fact that subjects placed in minority groups identify 
more with their group than those placed in non-minority groups (see also 
Simon & Pettigrew, 1990). A study by Bartsch and Judd (1993) also confirms 
that the ingroup’s minority status and not simply its size accounts for its 
relative homogenization (see also Haslam & Oakes, 1995; Judd & Bartsch, 
1995; Simon, 1995). 
Other research suggests that the need for a positive social identity repres- 
ents a motivation underlying judgements of variability. In line with social 
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identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the fact of belonging to a given group 
contributes to the development of a positive social identity, on the condition 
however that the characteristics associated with this group compare favour- 
ably with those of other groups, i.e. that there be an evaluative difference in 
favour of the ingroup. By emphasizing the homogeneity of the ingroup on 
dimensions with positive evaluative connotations or simply on dimensions 
which are important for their identity, subjects preserve or establish the dis- 
tinctiveness of the ingroup. This idea is illustrated by Kelly’s study (1989) with 
English students who are Labour party sympathizers. Asymmetries in judge- 
ments of variability vary according to the importance which groups attach to 
given dimensions. This study is presented to the subjects as pertaining to 
images which Labour and Conservative party sympathizers have of one an- 
other. The task of subjects consists in judging homogeneity within the two 
parties on the basis of themes or values where an obvious opposition of views 
prevails, and on the basis of personality traits. Results show that subjects 
perceive the Labour party as being more homogeneous than the Conservative 
party with respect to political themes, whereas the reverse applies when it 
comes to personality traits. These results may be interpreted in different ways. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that subjects strive to make their group relatively 
distinctive, possibly in order to gain a positive social identity. 
An experiment conducted by Simon (1992a) indicates that perceived ho- 
mogeneity is stronger in the ingroup than the outgroup on dimensions associ- 
ated with the ingroup, whereas no such difference can be observed on 
dimensions associated with the outgroup. In a similar vein, it is worth men- 
tioning Simon and Pettigrew’s experiment (199O), in which researchers carry 
out an asymmetrical categorization. Here, only one group is explicitly defined, 
the existence of the other group being inferred on the basis of the existence of 
the well-defined group (the second group is made up of people who do not 
belong to the first group). Broadly speaking, results suggest that members of 
the well-defined group emphasize their homogeneity on dimensions which are 
specific to them, whereas members of the ill-defined group emphasize their 
homogeneity on alternative dimensions (i.e. dimensions not associated with 
the definition of the other group). Given that the members of an ill-defined 
group possess no distinctive characteristics, they will seek dimensions on 
which they are likely to increase their homogeneity and thus acquire some 
distinctiveness. 
Assimilation and Differentiation between the Self and Others 
Subjects do not merely seek to preserve or to establish a positive image of 
themselves. They also feel the need to  be similar to others or to maintain their 
uniqueness, as demonstrated by the literature on social comparison processes 
(Codol, 1984b). For a long time, the idea that subjects compare themselves to 
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people who resemble them and associate with such people was upheld (Fes- 
tinger, 1954). However, such an idea was discarded when it became obvious 
that subjects seek to evade situations in which their feeling of uniqueness is 
threatened (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). With a few exceptions (Codol, 1975), 
these motivations are conceptualized as opposite forces. Indeed, there seems 
to be a basic conflict between the need to resemble others and the need to be 
a unique being (Ziller, 1964). 
Brewer’s model of optimal distinctiveness (1991) is based on this very 
conflict. According to the author, identity stems from a tension between two 
opposite needs: the need for assimilation, which refers to the inclusion of the 
self and others in a social category defined by shared characteristics or com- 
mon interests, and the need for differentiation, which refers to the exclusion 
of others in the definition of the self. Whether these needs are met or not 
depends, at least in part, on the ingroup’s level of inclusion (i.e. the number 
and diversity of people who may be classified as being part of the ingroup). 
Groups may vary with respect to their position on this dimension: they may 
be more or less inclusive, or more or less exclusive. Individual security and 
well-being are threatened at either extremity of this dimension: excessive 
depersonalization no longer offers a basis for self-definition, while excessive 
individualization renders one vulnerable to isolation and stigmatization. 
Consequently, any movement in the direction of either extremity activates an 
opposite tendency to restore the balance. Optimal distinctiveness is attained 
by identifying with a group whose level of inclusion meets both needs: assim- 
ilation and differentiation. Stated differently, subjects avoid definitions of the 
self which are likely to be either too inclusive or overly personalized. 
This model can be used to understand judgements of variability within the 
ingroup (Brewer, 1993). Such judgements seem to depend on factors which 
influence ingroup distinctiveness, such as a group’s size or its level of inclusion. 
The attention paid to distinctions between the self and others varies according 
to whether one’s categorization as a member of the group is optimal in regard 
to distinctiveness. Thus, the classification of the self as a member of a highly 
inclusive group, inasmuch as it does not meet the need for differentiation, 
increases the attention paid to distinctions between the self and other members 
of the group. Consequently, the more the group is inclusive, the more it will be 
perceived as being heterogeneous. When the ingroup is exclusive, however, one 
can expect the need for assimilation not to be met; here, homogeneity will be 
emphasized. These considerations do not, however, reduce to the simple postu- 
late that inclusive groups are more heterogeneous than exclusive groups. The 
motivational forces which come into play in this model only apply in the case of 
the ingroup. From the point of view of their identity, subjects are relatively 
indifferent to the distinctiveness of the outgroup. 
These propositions do not have a direct bearing on asymmetries in judge- 
ments of variability. Furthermore, no study has clearly demonstrated that the 
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needs for assimilation and for differentiation intervene in such asymmetries. 
Nonetheless, they help us to understand better the differences observed be- 
tween majority and minority groups (Mullen & Hu, 1989; Simon, 1992b) and 
also the reason for which the outgroup homogeneity effect is observed mainly 
in research on natural groups, which are often quite inclusive (Mullen & Hu, 
1989; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). 
Justifying Discriminatory Behaviours and Protecting Oneself against Them 
In the domain of intergroup relations, one often comes across the idea that 
the homogenization of the outgroup induces the adoption of behaviours 
which discriminate against it (Miller & Brewer, 1986; Wilder, 1986). Three 
experiments conducted by Wilder (1978) clearly illustrate this phenomenon: 
discrimination against the outgroup is stronger if such a group is perceived as 
being a relatively homogeneous entity. These results may be interpreted in 
various ways. For instance, one may conclude that the heterogenization of the 
outgroup makes the borders between groups less well-defined, thus reducing 
the intergroup nature of the situation. If this were true, a weakening of the 
tendency to favour the ingroup would come as no surprise. However, two 
subsequent experiments suggest that such an interpretation is not always 
fitting (Simon er al., 1990; Vanbeselaere, 1991). Indeed, even in instances 
where distinctions between the groups are relatively well defined, outgroup 
heterogenization reduces evaluative discrimination. In these experiments, the 
level of outgroup and ingroup variability is manipulated by the authors. Res- 
ults are convergent: outgroup homogenization increases favouritism towards 
the ingroup, whereas ingroup homogenization has no effect. 
It would appear from the above that discriminatory behaviours against a 
group are encouraged or justified if it is perceived as being a homogeneous 
and dehumanized entity made up of identical or interchangeable members. 
Furthermore, one may conclude that it is more difficult to discriminate against 
a group forming a heterogeneous entity composed of singularities. Intragroup 
variability is treated in these studies as an independent variable and its impact 
on intergroup behaviour is assessed. Nonetheless, they come up with a 
motivational explanation for the outgroup homogeneity effect: subjects are 
motivated not only to perceive the outgroup as being homogeneous (in order 
to justify discriminatory behaviours against it) but also to  give the impression 
that the ingroup is relatively heterogeneous (so that it can protect itself 
against discriminatory behaviours) (Wilder, 1986). To date, no experiment 
has been conducted to test this explanation. However, a study by Worchel and 
Andreoli (1978) appears to confirm its validity, demonstrating that the antic- 
ipation of aggressive behaviour towards other people goes together with their 
de-individualization, whereas the anticipation of friendly behaviour goes to- 
gether with their individualization. If subjects expect to have to inflict electric 
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shocks on a person, they recall mainly de-individualizing information, such as 
that person’s age, place of residence or origins. On the other hand, when they 
expect to have to reward a person, they recall mainly individualizing informa- 
tion, such as that person’s name and personality or physical traits. 
Validating the Opinions to which One Subscribes 
The tendency to homogenize the outgroup does not stem merely from the 
more ore less bellicose intentions one may have in its regard. Other motiva- 
tions also come into play, as underscored by research focusing on judgements 
of persons sharing or not sharing the same opinions as the self. On the basis of 
several postulates prevailing in the field of social comparison and attribution, 
Goethals, Allison, & Frost (1979) argue that the need to validate one’s opin- 
ions, i.e. to feel that they are correct, underlies judgements of variability. 
These authors suggest that subjects are able to increase the confidence in their 
opinions in two different ways. Either they can believe that a relatively signifi- 
cant proportion of people hold the same opinions as they do, or they can 
believe that these people have relatively heterogeneous values, attitudes or 
fields of interest. Even though subjects have to yield to reality when evaluat- 
ing the number of people who hold the same opinion as they do, by increasing 
the heterogeneity of these people, they can succeed in convincing themselves 
of the validity of their own opinions. In fact, this second tendency affords 
subjects the possibility of believing that the consensus to which they subscribe 
cannot be reduced to a common bias, that it does not reflect their personal 
characteristics, but rather that it stems from the object itself or, to use a word 
coined by Kelley (1967), from the entity. Clearly, an opinion based on charac- 
teristics shared by the people who hold this opinion is less credible than an 
opinion based on the nature of the object. 
Even though the first tendency appears to be more general than the second 
(Manstead, 1982), both contribute to the validation of opinions held by sub- 
jects, who thus successfully convince themselves of the relevance of such 
opinions and discredit contrary points of view. When held by a limited num- 
ber of people and stemming from characteristics suggesting that these people 
form a homogeneous entity, contrary points of view are necessarily invalid or 
biased. Three studies provide an illustration of this argumentation (Goethals, 
Allison, & Frost, 1979). Be it with respect to feminism, to action taken by the 
President of the United States or to trade ties with South Africa, subjects 
overestimate the proportion of people who hold the same opinions as they do 
and perceive such people as being more heterogeneous than those holding a 
contrary opinion. These results may be interpreted in numerous ways, as the 
authors do not fail to point out. Instead of postulating that subjects perceive 
people who share the same opinions as being relatively heterogeneous, one 
could just as easily assert that subjects adopt an opinion because it is shared 
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by relatively heterogeneous people. Furthermore, ingroup heterogenization 
may well result from a belief that only ingroup opinions are valid, rather than 
be a way of validating such opinions. 
However, other results may be interpreted in line with the above approach. 
An experiment conducted by Simon and Mummendey (1990) shows that, 
when subjects lack explicit information on the size of groups, they believe that 
the ingroup is larger and more heterogeneous than the outgroup. These find- 
ings tie in with the results obtained by Kelly’s study (1989) in which subjects 
perceive the members of the Labour party, with whom they have some af- 
finity, as being more homogeneous than the members of the Conservative 
party with respect to political themes, whereas they perceive the members of 
the Labour party as being more heterogeneous than the members of the 
Conservative party when it comes to personality traits. There is little doubt 
that internal divisions represent a handicap for a political party. Accordingly, 
it is important to preserve the party’s cohesion, at least in areas which con- 
stitute its specificity. On the other hand, if a party has relatively hetero- 
geneous personalities in its ranks, it is less easy to cast aspersions on the 
stances which it takes up. Even in groups such as political parties or religious 
communities, which must a priori be homogeneous, internal heterogeneity 
may answer certain needs (see also Kelly, 1988). In particular, it may help 
members increase their self-confidence in instances where they have to de- 
fend a point of view to which they subscribe. 
Making the Outgoup Predictable 
One final motivation frequently posited in this field is the need to make the 
outgroup predictable. Several studies underscore the fact that subjects dif- 
ferentiate more between people they dislike than between those with whom 
they have some affinity (Irwin, Tripodi, & Bieri, 1967). This tendency proba- 
bly stems from the threat represented by the people they dislike. When faced 
with such people, who represent a source of anxiety, subjects are particularly 
watchful (Miller & Bieri, 1965). This increased attention leads to a tendency, 
on the part of subjects, to differentiate between these people and to articulate 
them in a relatively complex manner. The aim is to reduce anxiety by making 
their behaviours predictable (Kelly, 1955). In other words, being able to dif- 
ferentiate between people in regard to whom they experience negative affects 
gives subjects the impression of being better able to manage the threat they 
represent, insofar as their behaviours become predictable. Such an impression 
results in reduced anxiety. 
Stephan (1977) argues that the above explanation, developed in connection 
with judgements of individuals, can be transposed to judgements of groups. 
Outgroups are generally evaluated negatively by suhjects and are frequently 
viewed as a threat. If they know in advance how the members of a group are 
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going to behave, subjects feel better prepared to interact with them, which 
results in a lower level of anxiety. In this approach, an outgroup may thus be 
expected to be perceived as being more heterogeneous than an ingroup. The 
results from a study conducted by this author are compatible with the afore- 
mentioned explanatory principle: when schoolchildren of different ethnic 
backgrounds are asked to describe, on the one hand, their ethnic group and, 
on the other, two ethnic groups to which they do not belong, they apparently 
perceive the two latter groups as being more heterogeneous than the 
former. 
We should point out that an explanation based on the need to make the 
outgroup predictable may well lead to an opposite tendency, i.e. to the 
homogenization of the outgroup. Some studies suggest that, the more a 
group is homogeneous, the more subjects feel that they are able to predict 
the behaviours of its members. Indeed, intragroup variability reduces the 
tendency to generalize, to the group as a whole, an observation made in 
regard to a single individual (Nisbett et af., 1983; Park & Hastie, 1987; 
Quattrone & Jones, 1980): the lower the perceived variability of the group, 
the stronger the tendency to generalize. Subjects believe that a homoge- 
neous group is a predictable group. Increasing the homogeneity of the out- 
group could be one way of making “functional” assumptions on how to 
behave with its members (Quattrone, 1986; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). If 
subjects perceive the outgroup as a homogeneous entity, the knowledge 
they have of that group applies to a majority of its members. As such, they 
will feel that their knowledge is general and stable, and that it provides them 
with largely unambiguous assumptions on the way to behave with the mem- 
bers of that group. 
INTEGRATING COGNITIVE AND MOTIVATIONAL 
FACTORS 
We should mention that, while cognitive approaches are almost exclusively 
centred on the outgroup homogeneity effect, motivational approaches usually 
indicate that such an effect is not a permanent feature and that an ingroup 
homogeneity effect may sometimes be observed instead. At first sight, the gap 
between cognitive and motivational approaches appears difficult to fill. The 
opposition between these two approaches is easily understood if one con- 
siders their respective underlying models (Marques, 1993): in cognitive ap- 
proaches, subjects have a role not unlike that of an observer, whereby they 
deal with information according to their capacities and express judgements on 
the basis of what information is in their possession; in motivational ap- 
proaches, subjects are committed by their perceptions and they make judge- 
ments of strategic value. 
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Cognitive and Motivational Factors in Judgements 
The approach developed by Marques (1993; Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 
1992; Marques & Paez, 1994) does not set out to determine which is the better 
of the two models. Instead, it argues that both models coexist within subjects. 
This postulate reconciles the cognitive and motivational approaches, even in 
instances where the two lead to diametrically opposed predictions. Linville 
(1982; Linville & Jones, 1980) suggests and illustrates that evaluative judge- 
ments are less extreme when they pertain to a member of the ingroup than to 
one of the outgroup. According to this author, such a tendency stems from the 
fact that subjects possess a richer and more complex cognitive schema for the 
ingroup than they do  for the outgroup, which leads them to better qualify a 
judgement pertaining to a member of the first group than to one of the 
second. However, on a number of occasions, Marques (1990; Marques, Yzer- 
byt, & Leyens, 1988) brings to the fore an opposite tendency whose purpose is 
to preserve the social identity of subjects. The author talks of a “black sheep 
effect” to  describe the fact that people whose behaviour is considered un- 
desirable or not conforming to social norms are more belittled if they belong 
to the ingroup rather than to the outgroup, whereas the reverse applies for 
desirable behaviour which conforms to social norms. 
If one accepts that judgements depend on cognitive factors in some in- 
stances and on motivational factors in others, it is possible to  reconcile the 
above results. In certain conditions, it appears that judgements are based on 
knowledge stored in the memory of subjects, and that judgements stemming 
from such knowledge are more qualified when they pertain to a member of 
the ingroup than to one of the outgroup. In other conditions however, when 
subjects are confronted with a member of the ingroup who contributes to 
their social identity in a negative manner, they launch into a process aimed at 
maintaining their social identity: here, the relative belittling of the member of 
the ingroup aims at preserving the global value of the group. A study by 
Branscombe et al. (1993) provides details on the conditions which produce 
one particular judgement rather than another. It demonstrates that, in situa- 
tions where there is a low level of identification between the subjects and the 
group to which they belong, judgements are more moderate in the case of 
ingroup members than in that of outgroup members, whereas when there is a 
high level of identification, a black sheep effect is observed. 
Judgements of variability also depend on cognitive or on motivational fac- 
tors, as the case may be. To be more precise, it would seem that judgements of 
the outgroup are based rather on knowledge of it, whereas judgements of the 
ingroup are based rather on a motivational factor related to the group’s social 
identity (Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992, Experiment 2). These findings 
may be paralleled with Brewer’s propositions (1993) which state that motiva- 
tional aspects come into play mainly in the case of judgements of the ingroup. 
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Furthermore, it would appear that the cognitive and motivational registers are 
more dissociated in judgements of the ingroup than they are in those of the 
outgroup (Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992, Experiment 2). 
A Model of Egocentric Social Categorization 
The model of egocentric social categorization developed by Simon (1993) is 
yet another approach integrating the two registers. It describes the way in 
which subjects cognitively construct social categories. The fundamental postu- 
late of this model is that subjects tend to make egocentric cognitive differen- 
tiations, at least in societies whose culture is marked by individualism 
(Triandis, 1990). This means that differences between the self and others are 
more distinct than differences between other people. This proposition is 
backed not only by the fact that subjects possess a greater quantity of infor- 
mation on themselves but also by their need for singularity or uniqueness 
(Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). Thus, the basic level of cognitive differentiation is 
the level between “me” and “not me”. 
The knowledge which subjects have of any given person may be represented 
by a set of characteristics. When subjects think about the differences between 
two people, the characteristics which distinguish them from one another are 
salient rather than the characteristics which they have in common (McGuire & 
McGuire, 1988). When subjects make a categorization between “me” and “not 
me”, the salient characteristics which they use to regroup certain people under 
the “not me” label are those which distinguish these people from the self. The 
characteristics which they share with certain people are not salient; the only 
characteristics which come to mind are those which make them a unique being. 
However, of all the people placed in the “not me” category, all of whom belong 
to outgroups, some probably share one or more salient characteristics. 
This egocentric tendency in cognitive differentiations makes the con- 
struction of an ingroup more difficult for subjects; indeed, such a process 
requires the ability to perceive characteristics shared with other people, none 
of which are salient. The construction of outgroups is easier: among the 
people grouped under the “not me” label, some share at least one salient 
characteristic. Consequently, an ingroup will be perceived more as an ag- 
gregation of separate entities, whereas an outgroup will be perceived more as 
a homogeneous category (see also Allen, 1985), explaining why the ingroup is 
usually perceived as being more heterogeneous than the outgroup. However, 
we should also point out that factors which heighten identification with the 
group may thwart these egocentric tendencies. When this occurs, one ob- 
serves a change in the level of categorization which involves a relatively 
symmetrical construction of the ingroup and outgroup. 
At first sight, the above model would seem to call into play mainly cognitive 
factors. Nonetheless, its premises are founded on motivational and cultural 
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considerations. On the one hand, egocentric tendencies result at least in part 
from an individual motivation, namely the need to assert one’s singularity. On 
the other hand, it appears that such a motivation is the earmark of societies 
whose cultures may be described as individualistic. 
Levels of Categorization and Social Identity 
The interplay between cognitive and motivational factors is even more ob- 
vious in the approach developed by Haslam et af. (1995; in press; see also 
Haslam & Oakes, 1995; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994) and based on self- 
categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner et af., 1987). It may be worth 
recalling that self-categorization theory includes a series of postulates and 
hypotheses on the functioning of the self concept. The cognitive represen- 
tation of the self takes the shape of a self-categorization process at varying 
levels of abstraction. Among these levels, one may differentiate between the 
level of the self as a human being or a member of the human species, the level 
of the self as belonging to a particular group to the exclusion of other groups, 
and the level of the self as a unique and specific individual. These different 
levels define respectively the human, social and personal identity of subjects. 
Self-categorization theory does not focus solely on the perception of the self; 
it also deals more generally with the similiarities and differences perceived 
within a group of people. The salience of a level of categorization appears to 
lead to an accentuation of intracategory similarities and intercategory dif- 
ferences. In addition, given the functional antagonism prevailing between the 
different levels of categorization, the salience of one level of categorization 
hampers the perception of intracategory differences and intercategory 
similarities at other levels. Of course, this is reminiscent of several aspects of 
the process of social categorization (Tajfel, 1972; 1981). 
At first sight, self-categorization theory appears to say nothing of possible 
asymmetries in judgements of variability (Turner, 1985; Turner et af., 1987). 
What it postulates clearly is that the ingroup and outgroup are perceived on 
the basis of the same principles and that their cognitive construction is sym- 
metrical. Indeed, one of the theory’s stated objectives is to specify the condi- 
tions in which the ingroup and outgroup are perceived in a relatively 
symmetrical and homogeneous manner. But asymmetries in the perception of 
groups may exist outside these conditions. 
The way in which a group of people is perceived, i.e. the level of categoriza- 
tion used, depends on contextual factors. In the case of the outgroup, judge- 
ments of variability often occur at least implicitly in a context of intergroup 
comparisons, whereas they occur more frequently in a context of interperso- 
nal comparisons in the case of the ingroup (i.e. where there are no com- 
parisons with an outgroup). This principle explains the outgroup homogeneity 
effect. However, judgements of variability pertaining to the ingroup may also 
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be based, in certain conditions, on intergroup comparisons, such as when 
social identities are salient, for whatever reason. When this occurs, one ob- 
serves a symmetry in ingroup and outgroup perception. 
Two studies involving Australian students back this approach (Haslam et 
al., 1995). In the first study, subjects are asked to consider a list of characteris- 
tics and to select the five which best typify, in their opinion, the people of a 
given country, who can be either Australians or Americans. Subjects are then 
requested to evaluate the proportion of people to whom these characteristics 
apply. In one condition, they carry out this task solely for the people of the 
country which has been named. In the other condition, they are instructed 
that the task is to be performed both for the people of the country named and 
for those of the other country (respectively the Americans and Australians). 
Results indicate that subjects perceive the ingroup as being less homogeneous 
than the outgroup when they are asked to describe one group only, whereas 
this may not be said in the other condition. Furthermore, the ingroup is 
perceived as being more homogeneous when subjects describe both groups 
rather than only one, whereas the perception of the outgroup does not vary on 
this parameter. At this stage, the distinction between levels of categorization 
suffices to explain the results obtained. 
The motivational aspects of judgements play a role in the evaluative orien- 
tation of chosen characteristics, given that subjects seem to select less favour- 
able characteristics when describing the outgroup. This result would be trivial 
if it were not examined in light of the fact that subjects attribute less non- 
stereotypic characteristics to the ingroup than they do to the outgroup when 
describing the two groups. Stated differently, they freely acknowledge that a 
number of positive characteristics apply to the outgroup, but they are far 
more reluctant to apply negative characteristics to the ingroup. This disin- 
clination appears even more clearly in a second study conducted on the basis 
of the same principle. Here, the list of characteristics submitted to subjects 
consists either of a combination of positive and negative characteristics, or of 
exclusively positive and exclusively negative characteristics. The reluctance of 
subjects to apply the non-stereotypic characteristics to the ingroup is most 
obvious when the list submitted to them consists exclusively of negative char- 
acteristics. These results may doubtless be explained by the threat which such 
a task represents for their social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Thus, the 
articulation in this approach occurs on the basis of the link existing between 
the process of categorization and the motivation which underlies the social 
identity of subjects. 
It is possible to bring to the fore several similarities between the two ap- 
proaches we have just examined. In both cases, the authors differentiate 
between different levels of categorization, while at the same time insisting 
that their salience may vary. However, this convergence of views should not 
conceal the obvious differences between the two approaches. Simon (1993) 
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proposes the concept of “quasi-intergroup situations” to describe contexts in 
which relations with members of the ingroup occur at the interpersonal level 
and relations with members of the outgroup occur at the intergroup level. But 
such a concept is difficult to accept if the existence of a functional antagonism 
between the different levels of categorization is acknowledged (Turner et al., 
1987). In addition, Simon (1993) postulates the existence of a basic level in 
categorizations (that between “me” and “not me”) which makes personal 
identity a priori more salient than social identity, an assumption not posited 
by the proponents of the self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987; 
Haslam et al., 1995; in press). 
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS IN JUDGEMENTS OF INTRA- 
GROUP VARIABILITY 
On a number of occasions, Doise (1984; 1986; see also Lorenzi-Cioldi & 
Doise, 1990) argues that the primary aim of experimental social psychology is 
to articulate different levels of analysis. We should recall briefly here that 
Doise distinguishes four levels of analysis: the intra-individual level, pertain- 
ing to psychological processes; the situational level, describing the interplay of 
social relations likely to develop in a given situation; the positional level, 
based on differences of status often characteristic of social relations; and the 
level of societal beliefs and representations. 
A quick glance at the explanatory principles reviewed so far reveals that, 
more often than not, such principles relate to the intra-individual level of 
analysis. We are not for a moment suggesting that the authors whose work we 
have reviewed systematically disregard other levels of analysis; however, in 
their theoretical developments, they do not always give these levels due con- 
sideration. The primary concern of many authors remains, by and large, the 
understanding of the motivations and cognitive processes used by subjects 
when evaluating the variability within a group. Clearly, the intra-individual 
level of analysis alone cannot always account for asymmetries in judgements 
of variability. Considerations relating to cognitive processes and motivations 
should not be cast aside; rather, they should be integrated into an approach 
which takes full account of the relations between groups, their respective 
positions and the systems of beliefs and representations which are characteris- 
tic of the context in which such relations occur. 
We feel that an undertaking of this kind would pave the way for an analysis 
of the conditions in which one explanatory principle is applicable rather than 
another. Having to choose among the plethora of explanatory principles is 
certainly no easy task. And although no one principle seems able to describe 
the entire set of empirical results at hand, all appear to be relevant. Rather 
than attempting to decide between various explanatory principles and 
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sometimes rejecting all but one, it would seem more worthwhile to analyse the 
conditions of applicability of each principle and even to articulate them. We 
have examined various models describing the way in which subjects organize 
their information on groups and express judgements of variability. The ob- 
vious discrepancies between these models certainly illustrate the wide range 
of subjects’ cognitive processes. It is therefore important to determine the 
conditions in which a particular type of cognitive process is used (Park, Judd, 
& Ryan, 1991; Smith & Zarate, 1990). The different motivations referred to 
when explaining asymmetries in judgements of variability sometimes lead to 
contradictory predictions. This does not create a problem as long as the 
conditions in which a particular motivation underlies judgements of vari- 
ability can be specified. However, defining the likely conditions of applic- 
ability of an explanatory principle almost inevitably requires going beyond 
the realm of intra-individual analysis. 
A number of studies already suggest that judgements of variability should 
be examined in a less restrictive manner, i.e. not solely from the viewpoint of 
the intra-individual processes which they call into play. This corresponds to 
our own position on the issue. We now examine these studies against the 
backdrop of the different levels of analysis posited by Doise (1986). 
The Intra-individual Level of Analysis 
This level of analysis does not pertain exclusively to the cognitive and motiva- 
tional registers, it also relates to affects. Stroessner and Mackie (1992; 1993) 
demonstrate clearly that the affective state of subjects has a bearing on their 
judgements of variability. In the three experiments described by these authors, 
the mood of subjects is manipulated by showing them a short film in order to 
induce in them positive, negative or neutral moods. Subsequently, the alleged 
behaviours of the members of a group are presented to subjects, such be- 
haviours being more heterogeneous or more homogeneous depending on the 
conditions. The task of subjects consists in judging the variability of the mem- 
bers of the group. One observes clearly that subjects placed in conditions of 
neutral mood perceive the most heterogeneous rather than the most homoge- 
neous group as having the highest variability, an observation which suggests 
that subjects are sensitive to the group’s true variability (see also Judd, Ryan, & 
Park, 1991; Nisbett & Kunda, 1985). When subjects are placed in conditions of 
positive or negative mood, they do not “perform” as well, possibly because the 
affective state they experience mobilizes part of their attentional resources. 
Indeed, when subjects are given additional time to examine the behaviours 
submitted to them, their performance is no longer influenced by the affective 
state induced (Stroessner & Mackie, 1993, Experiment 3). 
These authors do not set out to explain asymmetries in judgements of 
variability. Nonetheless, the role played by affects in asymmetries is certainly 
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worthy of consideration. An experiment similar to the above could be devised 
to determine how ingroup and outgroup variability judgements are mediated 
by the affective states of subjects. Underlining the role of affects is a useful 
enterprise, but defining the social conditions which mobilize a given affective 
reaction is equally important. What are the interactions which generate posi- 
tive or negative affects? Conflictual interactions apparently tend to generate 
negative emotions such as hatred and anxiety, whereas cooperative interac- 
tions lead more easily to positive emotions such as joy and satisfaction 
(Stroessner & Mackie, 1993). Relations between groups may not always be 
characterized exclusively on the basis of their more or less competitive or 
cooperative nature; sometimes they may also relate to questions of domina- 
tion and power. What affects are associated with these types of relations? The 
previously mentioned research undertaken by Islam and Hewstone (1993) on 
Hindu-Muslim relations in Bangladesh demonstrates that, the more subjects 
are anxious when they interact with members of the outgroup, the more they 
perceive the outgroup as being homogeneous. In addition, Hindus are appar- 
ently more anxious than Muslims when they interact with members of the 
outgroup. Finally, the relationship between anxiety and perceived homoge- 
neity is more marked in Hindus than in Muslims. When interpreting such 
differences, the authors do not fail to take account of the positions occupied 
by the two groups in Bangladesh: Hindus constitute a dominated minority 
group, whereas Muslims constitute a dominant majority group. As can be 
seen here, taking account of the influence of intra-individual factors in judge- 
ments of variability does not prevent, and in some instances even requires, the 
inclusion of factors pertaining to different levels of analysis. 
The Situational Level of Analysis 
Analyses carried out at the situational level underscore more particularly the 
fact that different situations or social contexts mobilize specific psychological 
dynamics. This point may be illustrated by demonstrating that when relations, 
interactions or modes of contact between groups vary, judgements of vari- 
ability are modified. An experiment by Judd and Park (1988) is useful in this 
regard. It shows that relations between groups have a bearing on the cognitive 
processes of subjects. During each session eight subjects, divided into two 
groups allegedly on the basis of their responses to a perceptual task, are 
requested to anticipate either a cooperative or a competitive interaction be- 
tween the groups. First, subjects mention some items of information on them- 
selves, such as their age, name, and place of origin. Then, they express a 
number of judgements on the central tendency and the variability of the two 
groups. Finally, they are invited to recall information on the members of each 
group. Results are unambiguous: when subjects anticipate a competitive inter- 
action with the outgroup, an outgroup homogeneity effect is observed, a 
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phenomenon which does not occur when a cooperative interaction is antici- 
pated. In other words, the outgroup is perceived as being more homogeneous 
if subjects expect to have to compete rather than cooperate with it. Further- 
more, the memorization of information on members of the outgroup is more 
efficient in the first case than in the second. These results are interesting in 
various respects. On the one hand, the homogenization of a group may con- 
ceivably be accompanied by an increase in the attention paid to the individual 
characteristics of its members. On the other hand, the interactions anticipated 
by subjects influence their judgements. From the above, one may conclude 
that the processes used by subjects to deal with information on groups are 
intimately linked to the situations in which they find themselves. 
A similar reasoning may be developed in regard to the motivations underly- 
ing judgements of variability: they also depend on the relations between 
groups. Rather than examining Judd and Park’s results (1988) relating to the 
cognitive processes which subjects call into play, it may be worthwhile to 
examine the motivations mobilized by the relations which are induced. The 
outgroup homogeneity effect observed by these authors may possibly stem 
from the need to justify the competitive behaviours anticipated by subjects 
(Wilder, 1986). As for the heightened attention paid to the individual charac- 
teristics of outgroup members in instances where subjects expect to compete 
with them, it may possibly be explained by the need to make the outgroup 
predictable (Stephan, 1977). 
According to Brown and Wootton-Millward (1993), judgements of vari- 
ability assist in developing and maintaining social identities, although the 
intensity of this motivation clearly varies according to the social context. It 
turns out that subjects feel particularly motivated to increase their relative 
homogeneity when the groups have just formed or at key moments in their 
history; this is especially true with respect to dimensions deemed important in 
terms of social identity. Based on this type of consideration, the experiment 
conducted by Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, & Grossman (1992) indicates that 
motivations underlying judgements of variability vary according to the man- 
ner in which interactions between the groups take place. Suffice it to say, 
without going into the precise details of this experiment, that when groups 
have just formed, subjects strive to create a positive social identity for the 
ingroup and to preserve its unity. As a result, they are going to emphasize the 
homogeneity within the group and perceive the outgroup as being somewhat 
disorganized. This motivation is particularly strong if the two groups pre- 
viously formed only one. After a series of competitive interactions between 
the groups, and once the groups have moulded their own identity, the motiva- 
tions are going to change: the interest will focus on the efficiency of the group 
and on the individual goals of its members. At this stage, it becomes desirable 
to perceive the ingroup as being relatively heterogeneous. Indeed, if a group 
is composed of members with varying levels of skills, it will be more successful 
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in carrying out the tasks attributed to it and will show greater efficiency. 
Furthermore, acknowledging the internal diversity of a group affords its indi- 
vidual members greater freedom in the pursuit of their own personal 
objectives. 
The introduction of situational factors in the study of judgements of vari- 
ability is also likely to improve one’s understanding of the role played by a 
factor such as familiarity. The view is generally held that, the more one is 
familiar with a group, the more one perceives it as being heterogeneous 
(Linville, Fisher, & Salovey, 1989). However, this relationship is not always 
confirmed (Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981; Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992; 
Simon, Glassner-Bayerl, & Stratenwerth, 1991). In certain conditions, an in- 
crease in familiarity may even lead to the perception of increased homoge- 
neity within the group (Oakes et al., 1995; Simon, Kulla, & Zobel, 1995). In 
instances where interactions with the outgroup tend to occur in contexts 
where the groups are highly constrained by social roles, an increase in the 
frequency of such interactions may accentuate the homogeneity perceived in 
the outgroup (Quattrone, 1986). We know for a fact that social roles generate 
a certain uniformity in behaviour. Thus, subjects infer from what they observe 
that the members of the outgroup are all alike, at least on the behavioural 
dimensions apparent during such interactions. Being repeatedly exposed to 
the same type of information gradually strengthens the impression that the 
outgroup is homogeneous. The role frequently attributed to familiarity in 
judgements of variability is reminiscent of the role which contacts between 
groups are sometimes thought to play. However, an overview of reflections on 
this issue reveals that the effects of contacts between groups depend more 
particularly on the nature of such contacts and on the relations existing be- 
tween the groups under consideration (Amir, 1969 Hewstone & Brown, 1986; 
Stephan, 1987). 
The Positional Level of Analysis 
Groups only rarely occupy interchangeable positions: usually, one group en- 
joys a more favourable position than the other. The criteria on which these 
hierarchies are based are diverse. We have seen that some authors study the 
role played by the numerical status of groups in judgements of variability 
(Simon & Brown, 1987; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990), demonstrating that an 
outgroup homogeneity effect is more probable in members of a majority 
group, while an ingroup homogeneity effect is more frequently observed in 
members of a minority group. We have also pointed out that these authors 
offer a motivational explanation for such differences. A more cognitive ex- 
planation may also be developed. Take Mullen (1991) for instance, who ar- 
gues that information on a majority group is dealt with according to 
information on its exemplars, whereas information on a minority group is 
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dealt with according to the prototype associated with that group. In this 
approach, subjects perceive the majority group as being more heterogeneous 
than the minority group, and this whatever their own group membership. 
Relations between majority and minority groups cannot be reduced to a 
simple numerical factor. It seems likely that the meanings which are at- 
tributed to minority groups are decisive: indeed, such groups are frequently 
associated with ideas of error, inferiority, deviance or weakness (Simon, 
1992b; Tajfel, 1981). This being said, the relative positions of groups may also 
be defined in terms of social status, power and prestige. Sometimes, these 
different criteria may co-vary, as illustrated in the research carried out by 
Brown and Smith (1989) on relations between men and women in British 
universities. In this environment, as in many other professional sectors, the 
numerical majority which men enjoy goes hand in hand with their occupying 
positions of greater power and prestige. The results of this study indicate that, 
whatever the gender group to which they belong, subjects perceive women as 
being more homogeneous than men. The research carried out by Hewstone, 
Islam, & Judd (1993, Experiments 1 and 2) is also useful in this regard: it 
shows that a religious group to which one does not belong is perceived as 
being more homogeneous than a religious group to which one does, on the 
condition that the latter group is located in a country where it enjoys a 
dominant and majority position. 
In the above-mentioned research, positional asymmetries between groups 
are characterized not only on a numerical basis but also according to dif- 
ferences in social status, power and prestige. However, the various criteria are 
not always linked in such a manner. Sometimes, numerically inferior groups 
are dominant. Simon and Hamilton (1994, Experiment 2) conducted an ex- 
periment in which the social status and majority or minority nature of the 
ingroup are independently manipulated. Here, subjects are categorized al- 
legedly on the basis of their aesthetic preferences. The relative size of groups 
is manipulated according to usual procedures (Simon & Brown, 1987), 
whereas their status is manipulated by informing subjects that one of the 
painters whose works are presented (either their preferred painter or the one 
they most dislike) enjoys greater consideration and is better received than the 
other one. Results show that members of the high-status majority group per- 
ceive their group as being more heterogeneous than the outgroup, whereas 
members of the high-status minority group perceive their group as being more 
homogeneous than the outgroup. In the two other possibilities, no asymmetry 
in the perception of intragroup variability is brought to the fore. 
All these results are not fully convergent. Nonetheless, they do suggest that 
dominant groups are often perceived as heterogeneous entities, whereas dom- 
inated groups are easily homogenized (see also Simon, Glassner-Bayerl, & 
Stratenwerth, 1991; Simon & Hamilton, 1994, Experiment 1). The differences 
between dominant and dominated groups often take the shape of relatively 
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contrasted intergroup representations: in terms of individual specificities for 
the group enjoying a dominant position and in terms of a collective lack of 
differentiation for the dominated group (Deschamps, 1982; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 
1988; Lorenzi-Cioldi & Doise, 1990). In general, the members of dominant 
groups are perceived as forming an entity made up of singular or unique 
beings. Here, the group is no more than a voluntary association of individuals, 
based on the individual or idiosyncratic qualities which exist outside the 
group. As for the members of dominated groups, they are perceived more as 
forming an entity made of undifferentiated elements. There is a tendency on 
their part to mention much more frequently their social belonging or collec- 
tive characteristics, which are sufficient for the purposes of self-definition. 
This opposition between dominant and dominated groups is only meaningful 
if the existence of a common symbolic referent is acknowledged, be it individ- 
uality, autonomy or singularity. Such a referent is in fact the cornerstone of 
dominant group representation. Indeed, groups are not closed systems which 
generate their particular systems of meaning: differences between groups only 
become apparent beyond a minimal threshold of common values. Thus, con- 
sideration of relations of domination bring another level of analysis into play: 
that of societal beliefs and representations. 
The Level of Analysis of Societal Beliefs and Representations 
A value is a persistently entertained belief that conducting oneself in a par- 
ticular way is socially preferable to conducting oneself in a different way 
(Rokeach, 1973). Generally speaking, values take the shape of a model which 
human society proposes to its members. As we have just underscored, the 
model in our societies emphasizes autonomous and singular individuality. In 
this context, it is interesting to note that the term “individual” is often used to 
signify not only that we are or should be independent persons in control of 
our own lives, but also that we are or should be different to all other people. 
Stated differently, greater importance is given to what makes individuals 
different than to what they share or have in common (Elias, 1987). The 
singularity or uniqueness of beings is hailed, as opposed to what is common or 
generic (Simmel, 1890/1989). Accordingly, one may well wonder whether, in 
certain conditions, the outgroup homogeneity effect is analogous to the supe- 
rior conformity of the ingroup effect (Codol, 1975). In situations where the 
respective position of groups is ill-defined, i.e. when subjects have little infor- 
mation on the groups, the occurrence of a process of this nature seems par- 
ticularly likely. 
Admittedly, values are social constructions which depend on the conditions 
in which they are produced. Accordingly, they are particular to a social and 
historical context. Intercultural comparisons shed some light on the role 
played by values in judgements of variability. In this domain, a common 
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distinction is the one made between individualist and collectivist cultures 
(Triandis, 1990), which encompasses numerous aspects. Suffice it to mention 
that, in the first type of culture, the individual is the basic element, personal 
goals come before those of the community, ties with others are distant and the 
value of singularity is enhanced. In the second type of culture, the community 
is the basic element, personal goals are subordinated to those of the group, 
ties with others are strong and the emphasis is placed more on the lack of 
differentiation. Various data indicate that, in these two types of culture, sub- 
jects do not perceive intragroup variability in the same manner. Lee and 
Ottati (1993) compare judgements of variability expressed by American and 
Chinese students with respect to the inhabitants of both countries. It turns out 
that an outgroup homogeneity effect is obtained in the former group, and an 
ingroup homogeneity effect in the latter. In view of the observation that 
American students attach greater value to heterogeneity than their Chinese 
counterparts, it is possible to conclude that these effects stem, at least par- 
tially, from systems of beliefs and representations particular to these cultures. 
Other results confirm that the members of an individualist culture perceive 
ingroups as being more heterogeneous than the outgroups, whereas the op- 
posite may be observed with respect to the members of a collectivist culture 
(Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). 
The role of systems of beliefs and representations can be illustrated in 
another way. It appears likely that subjects share a general belief that out- 
groups are relatively homogeneous (Wilder, 1981; 1984). In situations where 
they possess practically no information on a given outgroup, rather than 
assuming that the outgroup must be at least as heterogeneous as the ingroup, 
they base their perception of the outgroup on the belief that it constitutes a 
homogeneous entity. What they notice or retain with respect to the members 
of the outgroup, as well as the judgements they make in their regard, is 
determined by the belief they entertain. This is no different from a self- 
fulfilling prophecy process (Wilder, 1984): subjects assume that the outgroup 
is relatively homogeneous, the observations they make confirm their expecta- 
tions, their judgements reflect such expectations, and their initial belief is 
reinforced as a result. From the above, we can also conclude that judgements 
of variability do not stem so much from the information to which subjects are 
exposed as from the information which retains their attention (Quattrone, 
1986). 
CONCLUSION 
The relations between groups in a given situation, the positional asymmetries 
which exist between them as well as the systems of societal beliefs and rep- 
resentations all have to be taken account of when examining judgements of 
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variability. The study of cognitive processes and motivational dynamics re- 
quires the inclusion of factors outside the intra-individual level of analysis, 
although this in itself is not sufficient. This would lead to considering sys- 
tematically the same types of causal relations between the different levels, 
thus restricting the analysis to the understanding of how certain social factors 
determine cognitive processes and motivational dynamics. However, judge- 
ments of variability also play an active role in social relations. When subjects 
evaluate variability within a group, they produce meanings and represen- 
tations, in short part of social reality. Judgements of variability thus contrib- 
ute to the fashioning of social relations. In particular, relations between 
groups are defined by means of such judgements, which create, justify or 
negate certain social divisions. Consequently, judgements of variability, cogni- 
tive processes and the motivations which they mobilize, while all modified by 
social relations, also play a pivotal role in the elaboration of such relations. 
Indeed, they frequently represent a means to shape, safeguard or transform 
social relations. 
Having reached the end of this review, we are in a position to conclude that 
studies on judgements of variability are situated at the crossroads of current 
priorities in social psychology. Furthermore, it should be stated that such 
studies may lead to further developments. In this vein, the consequences of 
these judgements were examined more specifically. We noted that the percep- 
tion of intragroup variability could have a bearing on the extremization of 
evaluative judgements (Linville, 1982; Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992; see 
also Denhaerinck, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 1989) and on the tendency to general- 
ize to the group as a whole an observation made in regard to one individual 
(Nisbett el al., 1983; Park & Hastie, 1987; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Further- 
more, it was recently- demonstrated that low group Variability goes together 
with the perception that such a group is consistent and that it forms an entity 
(McGarty et al., 1995). Several studies suggest that perceived variability plays 
a role in the shaping of stereotypes (Ford & Stangor, 1992) and in their 
modification (Hewstone, Johnston, & Aird, 1992). In addition, it appears that 
the impact of stereotypes on the treatment of information relating to a mem- 
ber of a given group varies according to whether this group is perceived as 
being more heterogeneous or more homogeneous (Lambert, 1995; Lambert 
& Wyer, 1990). 
Studies on judgements of variability also encourage us to reconsider certain 
questions such as the link between intragroup variability and intergroup dif- 
ferentiation. In the area of relations between groups, there is a tendency to 
base one’s analysis on the premise that a negative link exists between dif- 
ferentiation within groups and differentiation between such groups (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). In other words, the homogenization of groups is accompanied 
by an increase in the differences existing between them. However, this propo- 
sition does not constitute a rule. The studies we have examined suggest in 
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particular that groups are not necessarily perceived as homogeneous entities. 
At least in certain conditions, the regrouping of individuals may stem from the 
perception of their heterogeneity. It is not easy to reconcile this observation 
with an approach based on the idea of a negative relationship between intra- 
group variability and intergroup differentiation. The links between the two 
are likely to be more complex (Doise & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1989; Lorenzi-Cioldi 
& Doise, 1990). As a result, taking account of alternative ways of concep- 
tualizing them is certainly very worthwhile. In this regard, it is necessary to 
give consideration to the idea that the two dimensions may co-vary (De- 
schamps, 1979; 1991; Doise, 1988): in certain conditions, intragroup variability 
and intergroup differentiation appear to increase or diminish concomitantly. 
Similarly, one should not disregard the possibility that the two may not be 
linked: the modifications of the former may not necessarily have a bearing on 
the modifications of the latter. Our duty is not to come out in favour of one 
conceptualization and reject all the others, once and for all. Rather, it consists 
in specifying the conditions in which these conceptualizations are likely to be 
observed. 
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